CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1513
26 May 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 MAY 1998 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN ISLAMABAD ON 23 MAY 1998 REGARDING THE SITUATION ARISING FROM INDIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS

The Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed a Press Conference in Islamabad on 23 May 1998 regarding the situation arising from India's nuclear tests. I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Prime Minister's statement at the Press Conference.

I shall be grateful if this statement is circulated as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) Munir Akram
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-61790

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Prime Minister's statement at Press Conference on 23 May 1998

I extend to you a warm welcome and that is inspite of the heat of the season as well as of May 11. Since that day the world around us has suddenly undergone a qualitative change. We have to contend with new realities, heightened dangers and an imminent threat to our security.

Since May 11, we are living under the dark shadow of Indian nuclear sabre-rattling. The fundamentalist Indian leadership, bared its teeth even before the dust settled at Pokhran. The Indian leaders could not contain themselves a minute longer. Immediately they raised the demand that "Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region". The open message was that Pakistan should abandon its principled policy to support the indigenous struggle of the people of Kashmir for their right of self-determination promised to them by India itself and the world community through the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

You would recall that I had a initiated dialogue with India with a view to resolving all the issues through peaceful means. The Indians have spurned the peace initiative and answered with atomic tests across our border and gone to the extent of threatening to use nuclear weapons. Statements emanating from Indian leaders virtually amount to a nuclear blackmail by India to impose a military solution in Kashmir. Overt Indian nuclear weaponization has seriously upset the strategic balance in the region and emboldened India to make a naked assertion of her hostile intentions towards Pakistan.

We are not surprised at the actualization of the Indian hegemonic agenda just as we were not surprised at the conduct of Indian tests. India has repeatedly committed aggression against us.

The Indian missiles and nuclear programme has never been a secret. For their own reasons and inspite of their full awareness of its vast range and sophistication the Western world has never before expressed any concern at the Indian nuclear programme. The BJP's national agenda clearly spoke of the nuclear option and the induction of nuclear weapons. We could see the writing on the wall. I immediately wrote letters to the leaders of major powers warning them of the impending danger. They chose to disregard our advice. How should we now understand or interpret their indignation at the Indian nuclear test? Have they offered any explanation to the world of their own indifference to the Indian nuclear programme and its culmination in tests ranging from low-yield to the thermo-nuclear?

We are being asked to show restraint. Have we not always shown utmost restraint for all those years since we have had the nuclear capability. Our record and commitment to non-proliferation has been impeccable. What did we earn in exchange for the restraint? Discriminatory and punitive measures were imposed on us. In a manifestly unjust and unfair approach Pakistan was penalised for every Indian escalatory step on the nuclear and ballistic ladder. The talk of sanctions is not only familiar to us but it also does not rattle us. We have learnt to live with these punitive measures.

Our legitimate need for security is still being ignored. This fills us with apprehensions even now. We have made clear to all our friends and well-wishers that we are not seeking any bargains. Can the Pakistani nation ever barter its independence, security and sovereignty? What is the price for liberty and freedom, dignity and honour?

Indian defiance on the other hand has even now attracted some sanctions but more understanding. Some have even offered endorsement.

No amount of condemnation or sanctions have changed the

immediacy or magnitude of the threat to us. Practically sanctions mean little and change nothing. The reality on the ground remains.

Pakistan has to contend with that reality and its dark shadow on our security. We have to contend with the Indian threats which may materialize any time. The Indian record of aggression and irresponsible behaviour is a stark reality for Pakistan. Our compulsions are not hidden. The balance of power in the region has been violently tilted. Under these circumstances our undivided focus must be on the preservation of our national security interests.

In this critical hour we are much encouraged by the steadfastness and the moral support of our friend China which is a peace-loving country and the only nuclear power which has promised not to use nuclear weapons, under any circumstances, against a non-nuclear weapon state. We are also heartened by expressions of support and solidarity by the Islamic world.

I am particularly grateful to President Clinton for his three telephone calls during which he conveyed his strong appreciation and understanding for the threat to Pakistan's security that has arisen as a result of the Indian nuclear tests. I also appreciate the concern shown by the other world leaders during their telephonic conversations with me.

Apart from threatening Pakistan, India is now blackmailing the world by offers of bargain on the CTBT. We believe that Indian actions have rendered the non-proliferation regime and instruments such as NPT and CTBT irrelevant. The Indian tests have posed now challenges and dilemmas in the field of non-proliferation. Fresh thinking is now needed on these issues.

Pakistan is a democratic country. The aspirations of the people of Pakistan provide the guiding path and determine our actions. Our nation has risen to the occasion. There is

complete national consensus to respond to the challenges and the threat. This nation has a history of facing challenges and has never submitted to threats. Any misadventure will meet a resolute response. The whole nation has demonstrated a sober and mature approach to this complicated situation. We have not taken any action in haste. We have not behaved in a tit-for-tat manner. We have not let any madness engulf us. Whatever decision we will eventually take, it will be in our supreme national interest.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1514
26 May 1998

Original: ARABIC, CHINESE
ENGLISH, FRENCH
RUSSIAN and SPANISH

LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1998 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION WHA51.8, ADOPTED BY THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY ON 16 MAY 1998, ON THE ISSUE OF "CONCERTED PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES"

With reference to my letter dated 3 February, 1998, concerning the resolution adopted by the Executive Board of the World Health Organization on the issue of "Concerted Public Health Action on Anti-Personnel Mines", please find enclosed herewith Resolution WHA51.8 adopted on 16 May, 1998, by the World Health Assembly on the same issue.

I would be grateful if you would circulate this resolution as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Mounir Zahran
Permanent Representative

GE.98-61796

FIFTY-FIRST WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY **WHA51.8**

Agenda item 20 16 May 1998

Concerted public health action on anti-personnel mines

The Fifty-first World Health Assembly,

Noting with great concern the dramatic consequences of injuries caused by anti-personnel mines, which particularly affect civilian populations and are uniquely tragic, so that they deserve special attention;

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996, the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997, and noting the progress made by the international community towards a global ban on anti-personnel mines, as well as the relevant decisions and initiatives taken in other forums;

Recalling Article 6 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, adopted in Oslo on 18 September 1997, and opened for signature on 3 December 1997, which provides that assistance for the care and rehabilitation of mine victims and for mine awareness programmes may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions;

Recalling operative paragraph C.2 of resolution EB95.R17 on emergency and humanitarian action, which requests the Director-General "to advocate the protection of non-combatants and the setting-up of effective treatment and rehabilitation programmes for the victims of anti-personnel landmines, as well as the systematic management of delayed health effects of mental and physical injuries in situations of collective violence";

Recognizing the serious consequences for health caused by anti-personnel mines as they, *inter alia*, limit population mobility, prevent access to arable land, resulting in malnutrition, hamper access to health services, contribute to the spread of communicable diseases like poliomyelitis and hinder their eradication, and, lastly, generate significant psychosocial disorders;

Recognizing that a total ban on anti-personnel mines will be an important contribution to global public health;

Welcoming the participation of over 120 Member States in the Ottawa Treaty Signing Ceremony from 3 to 5 December 1997;

Recognizing that WHO should contribute to coordinated activities of the United Nations system against anti-personnel mines by developing public health programmes for anti-personnel-mine injury prevention and control,

1. DECLARES that damage caused by the use of anti-personnel mines is a public health problem;

2. URGES all Member States to sign and ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction as soon as possible;

3. URGES governments of affected States to incorporate anti-personnel-mine injury prevention and assistance to victims, including treatment and rehabilitation, as a priority in national health plans;

4. URGES Member States to give due attention to the public health aspects of the Convention and provide the necessary resources to support implementation of the WHO plan of action on anti-personnel mines, bearing in mind the need for an integrated and sustainable approach;

5. URGES governments that have planted mines in the territories of other countries to provide the latter with the required maps and identification of the minefields they planted and to cooperate in minefield clearance in the countries concerned so as to avoid further injuries and deaths of civilians;

6. REQUESTS the Director-General, within the limits of available regular and extrabudgetary resources and in close cooperation with governments, appropriate organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations:

(1) to strengthen the capacity of affected States for the planning and execution of programmes for:

(a) better assessment of the effects of anti-personnel-mine injuries on health through the establishment or reinforcement of surveillance systems;

(b) the promotion of mine awareness and prevention programmes through health education, in cooperation with interested parties;

(c) strengthening and improvement of emergency and post-emergency management of anti-personnel-mine injuries, including treatment and rehabilitation, with special attention to psychosocial rehabilitation and within the context of integrated health service delivery;

(2) to support policy and programme planning by establishing, with other interested parties and as part of an integrated database for the United Nations system, a clearing-house for information on public health aspects of the use of mines.

Tenth plenary meeting, 16 May 1998
A51/VR/10

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1515
27 May 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 MAY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE BUREAU OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AT CARTAGENA ON 19 MAY 1998 CONCERNING THE NUCLEAR TESTS RECENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

I have the honour to transmit to you a statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia at the Ministerial Meeting of the Bureau of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries at Cartagena on 19 May 1998 concerning the nuclear tests recently conducted by the Government of India.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution to all members and participating delegations of the Conference on Disarmament as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) Agus Tarmidzi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-61836

STATEMENT BY
H.E. Mr. ALI ALATAS
FOREIGN MINISTER OF INDONESIA
made at Cartagena on 19 May 1998

"The recent nuclear tests conducted by a Member of our Movement have inevitably added to the complexity of issues related to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament which have been addressed by the international community since the advent of the atomic age. We sincerely regret this development. Indonesia is a party to the NPT and signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and, hence by definition, cannot condone the carrying out of nuclear weapon tests by any country at any time.

Indonesia fully acknowledges the sovereign right of states to determine their own security requirements and the means to ensure them, but as a non-nuclear weapon state, we are of the view that such a security policy should be implemented without recourse to nuclear arms.

It is undeniable, however, that the possession of these weapons by the five nuclear powers has conferred untenable privileges, incompatible with the sovereign equality of all states as enshrined in the UN Charter. As long as these are maintained, there will always be an incentive for the non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear-weapon capability. Hence, we call on the nuclear weapon states to fully implement both the letter and the spirit of agreements relating to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and on all states to refrain from developing these weapons and thereby facilitate the attainment of the ultimate goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1516
28 May 1998

Original: ENGLISH

JAPAN

Seminar Conference on Technical Issues
for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
11 and 12 May 1998, Geneva
Chairman's Summary

1. INTRODUCTION

The "Seminar Conference on Technical Issues concerning a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty" was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, from 11 to 12 May 1998 under the sponsorship of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Governmental experts in charge of nuclear issues from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America took part in the Seminar in their private capacities. Also, experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) attended the seminar, as did a number of leading nongovernmental experts. Many delegates to the Conference on Disarmament also took part in discussions. Generous logistic assistance was provided by the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament for the seminar. My gratitude is extended to all those individuals and organizations.

It is difficult to summarize the content of all the discussions held over the past one and a half days while still doing justice to all the points made by the participants. Therefore, the following is an account of only the salient points and the main thrusts of the discussions that took place, as seen by myself as the chairman of the seminar. While I will do my utmost to be as objective and fair as possible, it is with the awareness that my account may not be to the complete satisfaction of the participants, and it is with their abundant indulgence that I make the following summary of the conference.

One and a half days of informal but intensive meetings served as a valuable opportunity for all the participants to have a frank and in-depth exchange of views on the important question of how to address various technical issues concerning a FMCT.

Of course, the Seminar was primarily intended for deepening understanding

among those with diverse views, and not for the adoption of any agreed documents or statements. I am pleased to state that all the participants felt the last one and a half days of discussions were useful and rewarding in terms of deepening their understanding of important technical issues and in gauging the practicability of various ideas concerning a FMCT. It is hoped that the discussions in the Seminar will be conducive to further promoting our groundwork for the commencement of FMCT negotiations.

2. TECHNICAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE COVERAGE OF FMCT

The seminar opened with an excellent presentation concerning various significance of a FMCT with regard to arms control and disarmament.

The issue of possible coverage of a FMCT was discussed in the first session with particular attention to the terms of the Shannon Report.

Participants were of the opinion that a FMCT should prohibit the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and therefore that all plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU) must be placed under strict verification mechanism of this treaty. It was also pointed out that Uranium-233 should be treated similarly.

Participants also discussed how to deal with the issue of HEU used for naval propulsion purposes in the context of a FMCT. Some stressed that such HEU should be placed under appropriate material control and accounting. It was recognized that technical aspects of this issue merits further consideration.

The issue of fissile materials not directly usable for nuclear weapons such as low enriched uranium (LEU) and spent fuels were also discussed. While many emphasized the need to address these materials for greater assurance against diversion, it was cautioned that careful consideration is necessary in terms of financial implication.

It was the view of many participants that tritium should be out of the coverage of a FMCT.

Some participants raised the issue of existing stockpiles. In this connection, several variations of a potential scope of a FMCT was presented. Some others were of the

opinion that the scope of the treaty should be limited to the future production. A phased approach for greater transparency and irreversibility was also considered.

3. VERIFICATION MECHANISM UNDER FMCT

The issue of verification was considered in a part of the first session and in the entire second session.

A participant from nuclear weapon State stated that they are in the process of considering relevant issues taking into consideration both technical aspects and usefulness of specific measures. It was suggested by another participant that nuclear weapon States could share with non nuclear weapon States information on their relevant experience and technical problems they face.

In principle, participants shared the opinion that the purpose of the verification regime under a FMCT should be detecting both the diversion of fissile material and any undeclared enrichment or reprocessing. The issue of importation of relevant materials were also raised.

Concerning possible structure of a verification mechanism under the treaty, many participants were of the opinion that it would include routine-type inspections that would correspond roughly to the current comprehensive safeguards measures of the IAEA. It was also a shared view that some sort of challenge inspections are worth consideration. It was recognized during the discussions that if the level of assurance ensured through routine-type inspections was limited, the challenge inspections would play an important role. In addition, it was pointed out that some complementary measures along the lines of the Additional Protocol should be considered.

Also discussed was whether a legal instrument for the verification mechanism would take the form of verification agreements / arrangements like the case in the NPT.

Participants considered several verification alternatives that could be adopted under the treaty. Sets of facilities to be covered and corresponding verification measures, as well as each alternative's trade-off between the expected level of assurances and necessary costs were presented.

It was a shared view among the participants that the applicability of existing IAEA safeguards mechanism to a FMCT should be considered carefully. Difference may arise between these two because of objectives and obligations of a FMCT that is qualitatively different from those of the NPT, and also because of technical development in the field of verification measures. Therefore under a FMCT, important technical parameters such as "significant quantities" and "timeliness goal" may be different from those of existing IAEA safeguards system.

Many participants stressed the need of developing national systems such as a state's system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) and / or a physical protection system in nuclear weapon State as well as non parties to the NPT. Adequate information to be declared by States should also be considered.

Participants pointed out the need to consider problems arising from facilities in nuclear weapon States that are not designed to be placed under safeguards. Problems also arise from those states where military and civilian fuel cycle are not entirely separated. These problems will pose technical challenges, and in this context, it was suggested that prevention of leakage of information with proliferation risk would be an important issue for consideration.

The issue of termination of verification under a FMCT need to be further addressed, if the coverage of verification mechanism under the Treaty is similar to comprehensive safeguards system.

Many participants regarded the IAEA as the most suitable body to carry out verification tasks under a FMCT. Caution was expressed in this context that, as a FMCT would certainly entail a significant expansion of verification-related activities, due consideration is necessary with a view to acquiring additional infrastructure including competent human resources for inspection. It was made clear that the Agency remains ready to help in the process of further discussions and negotiations in whatever way considered appropriate and relevant by States.

It was the view shared by all participants that each of these verification issues merit further in-depth discussions.

4. ENSURING TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY

In the third and last session, issues of ensuring transparency and irreversibility was addressed. While issues there may be out of the scope of a FMCT, ensuring transparency and irreversibility were viewed by many participants as an extremely important element for consideration.

It was pointed out by a presenter that transparency is an essential component of irreversibility, and that, to ensure irreversibility, it would be desirable to take several steps.

It was also pointed out that stockpiles may contain sensitive information in relation to nuclear non-proliferation. It was suggested that useful experience could be learned from EURATOM as well as from South Africa in this respect. It was also noted that, as a first step, military direct-use material withdrawn from dismantled weapons and such material considered excess and designated for transfer into the civilian use, should be declared and properly managed in parallel with a FMCT. Caution was expressed, however, that such efforts would be more successful were they pursued independently with a FMCT, rather than addressed by the treaty itself. A participant stressed that a leap from secrecy to transparency is a political decision.

Many participants expressed their interest in an Australian proposal concerning a phased approach with a FMCT being the core and the first step of it.

SEMINAR CONFERENCE ON TECHNICAL ISSUES FOR A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

1.DATE

Monday, 11 May and Tuesday, 12 May

2.VENUE

Room H3, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland

3.PURPOSE

Through seminar-style deliberations focusing on technical aspects of a fissile material cut-off treaty, this conference aims at providing a basis for future negotiations of the treaty. In order to focus on technical aspects of the treaty, this conference does not discuss political issues related to the commencement of the treaty.

4.CHAIRMAN

Mr.Hiroyoshi KURIHARA
Senior Executive Director, Nuclear Material Control Center,
Tokyo, Japan

5.PARTICIPANTS

(1) Governmental experts from countries concerned,one expert from IAEA and several non-governmental experts
(2) Members of CD delegations

Schedule

11 May(Monday)

10:00 Opening

- introductory remarks by Ambassador Akira HAYASHI
- keynote remarks by Professor George BUNN

10:30 coffee break

10:50-13:00 SESSION 1 : Fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices

- What does "Shannon Mandate" mean in technical terms? (What is to be prohibited and what is to be placed under safeguard?)
  - -plutonium
  - -HEU
  - -LEU
  - -spent fuels
  - -naval fuels
  - -other issues

- Presentation by
  - -- Mr. Warren STERN, Senior Technical Adviser, Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division,ACDA, U.S.A
  - -- Dr.Annette SCHAPER, Senior Research Associate, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt
- General discussion among experts
- Questions and answers with CD delegates

14:30 SESSION 2: Verification

- -objective
- -structure
- -facilities to be covered
- -facilities that are not designed to be subject to safeguards from the beginning
- -preventing leakage of information with proliferation risk
- -other specific issues

- Presentation by
  - -- Mr.Demetrius PERRICOS, Director, Division of Operations(A), Department of Safeguards, IAEA
  - -- Mr.Kinji KOYAMA, Senior Fellow, Center for the Promotion and Non-proliferation, Japan
- General discussion among experts
- Questions and answers with CD delegates

16:15 Coffee break

16:30-18:00 SESSION 2 continued

12 MAY(Tuesday)

10:30 SESSION 3: Ensuring transparency and irreversibility
-measures for enhancing transparency
-measures for ensuring irreversibility
-approach to move ahead

- Presentation by
  - -- Ms.Rebecca JOHNSON, Acronym Institute
- General discussion among experts
- Questions and answers with CD delegates

12:00 coffee break

12:30 Summary by the Chairman

Closing

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. **Chairman**

Mr. Hiroyoshi KURIHARA, Senior Executive Director,
Nuclear Material Control Center, Japan

2. **Keynote Speaker and Presenters**

Prof. George BUNN, Professor, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University

Ms. Rebecca JOHONSON, Acronym Institute

Mr. Kinji KOYAMA, Senior Fellow, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan

Mr. Demetrius PERRICOS, Director, Division of Operation(A), Department of Safeguards, IAEA

Dr. Annette SCHAPER, Senior Research Assosiate, Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, Germany

Mr. Warren STERN, Senior Technical Adviser,
Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division, ACDA, U. S. A.

3. **Other Participants (Governmental experts and NGO representatives)**

Mr. Jaime ACUNA, Minister Counsellor,
Permanent Mission of Chili to the CD

Mr. Graham ANDREW, Department of Trade and Industry, U. K.

Dr. K. BALU, Head of Nuclear Waste Management Group, Department of Atomic Energy, India

Mr. John CARLSON, Director, Safeguard Office, Australia

Mr. Emmanuel COCHER, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Mr. Amnon EFRAT, Minister Counsellor,
Permanent Mission of Israel to the CD

Mr. Ibrahim Aly Saleh El-SHAHAWI, Chief of Nuclear Fuel Department, Nuclear Plant Authority, Ministry of Electricity and Energy, Egypt

Mr. Andreas FRIEDRICH, Chief of Section, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

Mr. Mark GLAUSER, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Canada to the CD

Dr. Peter HOWARTH, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Section, Nuclear Policy Branch, Australia

Dr. Max KELLER, Chief of Section, Atomic, Biological and Chemical Laboratory, Spiez, Switzerland

Mr. Bruno LE MAIRE, Non-Proliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Dr. Patricia M. LEWIS, Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Mr. Andre MERNIER, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Belgium to the CD

Dr. Tariq RAUF, Director, International Organizations and Non-Proliferation Project at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies

Mr. Michel RICHARD, Deputy-Director, International Relations Direction, Atomic Energy Commission, France

Mr. Navtej SARNA, Counsellor, Embassy of India in Tehran

Mr. Beat WIELAND, Chief of Section, Federal Office of Energy, Switzerland

Dr. Nick von WIELLIGH, Senior Manager of Nuclear Non-Proliferation of the Atomic Energy Cooperation, South Africa

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1517
29 May 1998

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 29 MAY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF MEXICO CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit the attached press release issued by the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Mexico concerning the conduct of underground nuclear-weapon tests by the Government of Pakistan.

The Permanent Mission of Mexico would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would take the necessary steps to distribute this text as a Conference document.

Secretariat for Foreign Affairs Press release

Tlatelolco, 28 May 1998

B-216

The Government of Mexico condemns and deplores the nuclear-weapon tests carried out today by the Government of Pakistan, and expresses its most serious concern at the initiation of a nuclear arms race in South Asia.

The carrying out of nuclear-weapon tests undermines and jeopardizes the international non-proliferation regime governing these weapons, which is indispensable to peace and world security, since the risk that they may come to be used increases in direct proportion to their spread, their build-up and their technological improvement. In turn, the use of nuclear weapons must be avoided at all costs, not only because of the indiscriminate, permanent and catastrophic damage they would cause, but because they could lead to the involvement of other nuclear-weapon States in an escalation which could endanger the very survival of mankind.

An effective non-proliferation regime for nuclear weapons must necessarily lead to nuclear disarmament. But the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world is impossible in a context of proliferation of such weapons in any of its aspects.

Mexico calls on India and Pakistan to immediately halt their nuclear-weapon tests and the development and accumulation of delivery vehicles, which exacerbate tension in their region, reduce security at the international level and hamper efforts designed to lessen the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

Mexico also appeals to all States to put an immediate halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and to begin urgent negotiations on an unequivocal and binding commitment to the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a broad and phased programme for the gradual and progressive reduction of nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems leading to their complete and final elimination in specific stages.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1518
2 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN ON 28 MAY 1998 ANNOUNCING THE CONDUCT OF NUCLEAR TESTS BY PAKISTAN

The Prime Minister of Pakistan made a statement on 28 May 1998 announcing the conduct of nuclear tests by Pakistan. I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Prime Minister's statement.

I shall be grateful if this statement of the Prime Minister is circulated as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) Munir Akram
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-62015

Statement made by the Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (28 May, 1998)

Pakistan today successfully conducted five nuclear tests.

2. The results were as expected. There was no release of radio-activity.

3. I congratulate all Pakistani scientists, engineers and technicians for their dedicated team work and expertise in mastering complex and advanced technologies.

4. The entire nation takes justifiable pride in the accomplishments of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories and all affiliated Organizations. They have demonstrated Pakistan's ability to deter aggression.

5. Pakistan has been obliged to exercise the nuclear option due to weaponization of India's nuclear programme.

6. This had led to the collapse of the "existential deterrence" and had radically altered the strategic balance in our region.

7. Immediately after its nuclear tests, India had brazenly raised the demand that "Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region" and threatened that "India will deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan".

8. Our security, and peace and stability of the entire region was thus gravely threatened. As a self-respecting national we had no choice left to us.

9. Our hand was forced by the present Indian leadership's reckless actions.

10. After due deliberation and careful review of all options we took the decision to restore the strategic balance. The nation would not have expected anything less from its leadership.

11. For the past three decades Pakistan repeatedly drew attention of the international community to India's incremental steps on the nuclear and ballistic ladder.

12. Our warnings remained unheeded.

13. Despite the continuing deterioration in Pakistan's security environment, we exercised utmost restraint.

14. We pursued in all earnest the goal of non-proliferation in South Asia.

15. Our initiatives to keep South Asia free of nuclear and ballistic weapon systems were spurned.

16. The international response to the Indian nuclear tests did not factor the security situation in our region. While asking us to exercise restraint, powerful voices urged acceptance of the Indian weaponization as a fait-accompli.

17. Pakistan's legitimate security concerns were not addressed, even after the threat of use of nuclear weapons and nuclear blackmail.

18. We could not have remained complacent about threats to our security. We could not have ignored the magnitude of the threat.

19. Under no circumstances would the Pakistani nation compromise on matters pertaining to its life and existence.

20. Our decision to exercise the nuclear option has been taken in the interest of national self-defence. These weapons are to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional.

21. Pakistan will continue to support the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the Conference on Disarmament, bearing in mind the new realities.

22. We are undertaking a re-evaluation of the applicability and relevance of the global non-proliferation regimes to nuclearized South Asia.

23. We are ready to engage in a constructive dialogue with other countries, especially major powers, on ways and means to promoting these goals, in the new circumstances.

24. Pakistan has always acted with utmost restraint and responsibility. We will continue to do so in the future.

25. We are prepared to resume Pakistan-India dialogue to address all outstanding issues including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as peace and security. These should include urgent steps for mutual restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilization.

26. Pakistan has already offered a non-aggression pact to India on the basis of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. I would like to reiterate this offer.

27. We have instituted effective command and control structures. We are fully conscious of the need to handle these weapon systems with the highest sense of responsibility.

28. We have not and will not transfer sensitive technologies to other States or entities.

29. At the same time, Pakistan will oppose all unjust embargoes aimed at preventing it from exercising its right to develop various technologies for self-defence or peaceful purposes.

30. I would like to again assure all countries that our nuclear weapon systems are meant only for self-defence and there should be no apprehension or concern in this regard.

31. The Pakistani people are united in their resolve to safeguard, at all costs, Pakistan's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

32. I would like to congratulate the nation on the achievements of our scientists and engineers. They have made it possible for the people of Pakistan to enter the next century, with confidence in themselves and faith in their destiny.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1519
2 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY ON 30 MAY 1998 FOLLOWING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TEST THAT DAY

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary made a statement on 30 May 1998 following Pakistan's nuclear test that day. I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the statement which may kindly be circulated as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) Munir Akram
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Foreign Secretary's statement on 30 May 1998

After successfully conducting five nuclear tests on 28 May 1998, Pakistan completed the current series by another nuclear test today. Let me clarify here that there was only one test conducted today.

All the tests conducted were fully contained. There was no release of radio-activity. The results were as expected.

The devices tested correspond to weapons configuration, compatible with delivery systems.

The Prime Minister has congratulated the Pakistani scientists, engineers and technicians on their mastering of complex and advanced technologies, through dedicated team work.

I know you are very keen and perhaps a little impatient to throw all your questions at me. But before I open the floor I think it will be useful for all of us present here, including friends who have travelled from far and wide, to see this whole question on nuclearization of South Asia in its political, indeed I dare say, its philosophical perspective.

To our friends in the Western world the nuclear question is uni-dimensional. Their undivided focus has been and

remains on non-proliferation as a concept. Only the philosophy of the concept as adopted to their own intent and purpose appeals to them. The all important underlying causes are conveniently ignored.

I would for a moment like to ask you to reflect on the obverse i.e. proliferation in South Asia. India initiated its nuclear programme right after independence and detonated a device in, as early as, 1974. New Delhi then feverishly engaged in a massive nuclear and missile programme to satisfy its grandiose ambitions and hegemonistic designs. Their track record at that point showed aggression against China, wars against Pakistan and a patently illegal occupation of Kashmir accompanied by total denial of the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir as enshrined in Security Council resolutions.

The fact of our existence as the neighbour of an expansionist and a hegemonistic power taught us the inevitable lesson that we must search for security. Contemporary history held only one lesson for us. The answer lay in credible deterrence. Today we have proved our credibility. There are no doubts left any more.

The era of ambiguity is behind us. But may I say to you, that the problem stays.

The high priests of non-proliferation do not scratch below the surface. The symptom is their problem. The disease afflicts us. A whole vast field of the non-proliferation

regime has been built up. The desire is to confine everybody within its four walls. But the real causes of insecurity, conflicts and tensions need to be addressed. It is, therefore, imperative to find a peaceful and just solution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

Condemnations and sanctions are expressions of the injured ego of the powers who arrogate to themselves the high responsibility of keeping the peace and the means to ensure peace, in their part of the world. For the rest of the world their interest does not go beyond their own pre-occupation with non-proliferation. They would leave the critical questions surrounding peace and security here to the narrow confines of the "bilateral context". They know very well that is a dark tunnel where sounds reverberate but do not lead to light at the end of the tunnel.

Genuine contribution to peace and security can be made by constructive engagement in the search for permanent solutions. The councils of the world should not be convened to heap more criticism for that will evidently be fruitless but to devise ways and means to address the real issues.

Our decision to exercise the nuclear option was an expression of self-defence.

In restoring this strategic balance, Pakistan has given only a bare minimum response.

It is not our intention to enter into an arms race. The

history of the Cold War era shows that such disastrous races are counter-productive and definitely not sustainable. The only race we propose to run is for economic development.

Over one billion peoples of our region do not want and certainly cannot afford to divert their precious resources for a nuclear confrontation in South Asia.

We are determined to seek ways and means to cool the temperature and to lower the tensions.

Pakistan has always exercised maximum restraint. We will continue to do so. Our capabilities demonstrated by our six nuclear tests are only for self-defence and only to deter aggression. This has been clearly stated by the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister has also affirmed Pakistan's determination to engage in a constructive dialogue with other countries especially major powers to determine new ways and means to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the world.

The Prime Minister has also reaffirmed the Government's determination to resume Pakistan-India dialogue to address all outstanding issues including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir as well as peace and security.

We are prepared to enter into discussions with India for talking all steps that are necessary to ensure mutual

restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilization in our region.

We have already stated at the highest level that Pakistan has not and will not transfer sensitive technologies to other states or entities.

The nuclearization of South Asia poses new challenges for global non-proliferation. The history of this region tells that non-proliferation cannot be ensured in a security void. Compelling security concerns have to be discussed together with measures to promote the goals of non-proliferation. Global non-proliferation regimes can best be promoted by addressing the very factors that impel proliferation.

The new global security order cannot be predicated in trying to freeze the iniquities and ignore injustices.

As a responsible country whose record of restraint and responsibility is impeccable, Pakistan today assures the international community and in particular India of our willingness to enter into immediate discussions to address all matters of peace and security including urgent measures to prevent the dangers of nuclear conflagration.

This sums up the true perspective of the issue that you are so keen to discuss with me today.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1520
2 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH
and RUSSIAN

NOTE VERBALE DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED ON 28 MAY 1998 BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE CONCERNING FIVE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS CARRIED OUT BY PAKISTAN ON 28 MAY 1998

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office and other International Organisations at Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to request the distribution as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament of the attached text of a statement issued on 28 May 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning five underground nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan on 28 May.

Statement
by
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

It is for the second time in this month that the aspirations of the international community for the nuclear-weapon-free world are subjected to severe hardships. Despite numerous appeals from the world community to show the utmost restraint in reciprocation to the nuclear tests in India, Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests. Therefore the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has been violated, dangerous background for farther nuclear arms proliferation in the world was founded.

As in the case of Indian nuclear tests, Ukraine condemns this step, made by Pakistan, and calls upon both countries to show restraint and responsibility in bilateral relations, this being in conformity to the interests of preserving peace and stability in the South Asia and in the world as a whole.

Recent developments in both countries revealed inefficiency of the existing procedures to control the nuclear weapons non-proliferation, as well as an urgent necessity for their radical improvement. Taking into consideration the extraordinary character of the situation in the South Asia, Ukraine deems necessary to consider this issue without any delay at the session of the UN Security Council.

Kyiv

28 May 1998

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1521
2 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 1 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MALAYSIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF TWO PRESS RELEASES ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF MALAYSIA RELATING TO THE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva presents is compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honor to transmit herewith two Press Releases issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia which are as follows:

i. Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia on the underground nuclear tests conducted by India; issued on 12 May 1998, and

ii. Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia on the underground nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan; issued on 29 May 1998.

The Mission has further the honor to request that both these Press Releases be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

GE.98-62033

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

PRESS RELEASE BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MALAYSIA ON THE UNDER GROUND NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY INDIA

Malaysia deplores the underground nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 May 1998. The action by India is a serious set back to keep the region free of nuclear weapons and undermines the efforts of the international community towards attaining a complete ban on nuclear testing. Malaysia is particularly disappointed that India has taken such a step in the light of the overwhelming adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Malaysia calls on India to cease developing its capability to produce nuclear weapons immediately. Malaysia further urges all countries in the region to exercise maximum restrain and refrain from action that could further heighten tension in the region. It is hoped that all countries would actively participate in international efforts aimed at achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Malaysia underlines the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in achieving the universal goal of general and complete disarmament and enhancement of peace and stability. Malaysia reiterates its strong opposition to nuclear testing and the continued possession of weapons of mass destruction. Malaysia further underlines the need for Nuclear Weapons States to demonstrate stronger commitment to the goals of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of these weapons through a programmed reduction and elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kuala Lumpur
MALAYSIA

12 May 1998.

PRESS RELEASE BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MALAYSIA ON THE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY PAKISTAN

Malaysia deplores the underground nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan on 28 May 1998. The action by Pakistan is a further set back to efforts to keep the region free of nuclear weapons and from the threat of nuclear conflicts. Malaysia calls on Pakistan to cease developing its capability to produce nuclear weapons immediately.

Malaysia is deeply concerned over recent developments in the South Asian region which would lead to a dangerous competition for nuclear superiority. Malaysia urges all countries concerned to refrain from such a competition, exercise maximum restraint and prevent the further escalation of tension.

The action by countries in the South Asian region to detonate nuclear devices have undermined the efforts of the international community towards attaining a complete ban on nuclear testing and achieving the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Malaysia is particularly disappointed that nuclear tests continue to be conducted despite the overwhelming adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Malaysia reiterates its strong opposition to nuclear testing and the continued possession of nuclear weapons. Malaysia urges all the nuclear weapons states to demonstrate a stronger commitment to the goals of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. Malaysia also calls upon all states to actively participate in international efforts aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kuala Lumpur
MALAYSIA

29 May 1998.

Remarks by President Clinton on May 28:

"Because of the explosion of the nuclear test this morning by the government of Pakistan, I would like to make a brief statement about that first, since this is my only opportunity to communicate with the media and the American people on that issue.

"First, I deplore the decision. By failing to exercise restraint and responding to the Indian test, Pakistan lost a truly priceless opportunity to strengthen its own security, to improve its political standing in the eyes of the world.

"And although Pakistan was not the first to test, two wrongs don't make a right. I have made it clear to the leaders of Pakistan that we have no choice but to impose sanctions pursuant to the Glenn amendment as is required by law.

"Now, I want to say again. It is now more urgent than it was yesterday that both Pakistan and India renounce further tests, sign the comprehensive test ban treaty, and a take decisive steps to reduce tensions in South Asia and reverse the dangerous arms race.

"I cannot believe that we are about to start the 21st century by having the Indian subcontinent repeat the worst mistakes of the 20th century when we know it is not necessary to peace, to security, to prosperity, to national greatness or personal fulfillment. And I hope that the determined efforts of the United States and our allies will be successful in helping the parties who must themselves decide how to define their future, to defuse tensions and avoid further errors."

Remarks by President Clinton on May 30:

"The United States condemns today's second round of nuclear tests by Pakistan. These tests can only serve to increase tensions in an already volatile region. With their recent tests, Pakistan and India are contributing to a self-defeating cycle of escalation that does not add to the security of either country. Both India and Pakistan need to renounce further nuclear and missile testing immediately and take decisive steps to reverse this dangerous arms race.

I will continue to work with leaders throughout the international community to reduce tensions in South Asia, to preserve the global consensus on nonproliferation.

I call on India and Pakistan to resume their direct dialogue, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and without conditions to reverse the arms race there, and to join the clear international consensus in support of nonproliferation."

Determination made by President Clinton on May 30:

"In accordance with section 102(b) (1) of the Arms Export Control Act, I hereby determine that Pakistan, a non-nuclear-weapon state, detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 28, 1998. The relevant agencies and instrumentalities of the United States Government are hereby directed to take the necessary actions to impose the sanctions described in section 102 (b) (2) of that Act.

"You [the Secretary of State] are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the appropriate committees of the Congress and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1523
2 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE SUO MOTO STATEMENT OD THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA, MR. A.B. VAJPAYEE, TO BOTH THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT OF INDIA ON 27 MAY 1998

I have the honour to transit herewith copy of the Suo moto statement of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee to both the Houses of Parliament of India, 27 May 1998.

I should be grateful if the above could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Savitri Kunadi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

SUO MOTO STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER MR. ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE IN PARLIAMENT ON 27 MAY, 1998

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Sir,

I rise to inform the House of momentous developments that have taken place while we were in recess. On 11 May, India successfully carried out three underground nuclear tests. Two more underground tests on 13 May completed the planned series of tests. I would like this House to join me in paying fulsome tribute to our scientists, engineers and defence personnel whose singular achievements have given us a renewed sense of national pride and self confidence. Sir, in addition to the statement I make, I have also taken the opportunity to submit to the House a paper entitled "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy"

2. In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self-reliance, and freedom of thought and action. We rejected the Cold War paradigm and chose the more difficult path of non-alignment. Our leaders also realised that a nuclear-weapon free-world would enhance not only India's security but also the security of all nations. That is why disarmament was and continues to be a major plank in our foreign policy.

3. During the 50's, India took the lead in calling for an end to all nuclear weapons testing. Addressing the Lok Sabha on 2 April, 1954, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, to whose memory we pay homage today, stated "nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction". He called for negotiations for prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear testing. This call was not heeded.

4. In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals, provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights and obligations was not accepted. In the 60's our security concerns deepened. The country sought security guarantees but the countries we turned to were unable to extend to us the expected assurances. As a result, we made it clear that we would not be able to sign the NPT.

5. The Lok Sabha debated the issue on 5 April, 1968. Prime Minister late Mrs. Indira Gandhi assured the House that "we shall be guided entirely by our self-enlightenment and the considerations of national security". This was a turning point and this House strengthened the decision of the then Government by reflecting a national consensus.

6. Our decision not to sign the NPT was in keeping with our basic objectives. In 1974, we demonstrated our nuclear capability. Successive Governments thereafter have taken all necessary steps in keeping with that resolve and national will, to safeguard India's nuclear option. This was the primary reason behind the 1996 decision for not signing the CTBT, a decision that also enjoyed consensus of this House.

7. The decades of the 80's and 90's had meanwhile witnessed the gradual deterioration of our security environment as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation. In our neighbourhood, nuclear weapons had increased and more sophisticated delivery systems inducted. In addition, India has also been the victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, militancy and clandestine war.

8. At a global level, we see no evidence on the part of the nuclear weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world. Instead, we have seen that the NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five countries.

9. Under such circumstances, the Government was faced with a difficult decision. The touchstone that has guided us in making the correct choice clear was national security. These tests are a continuation of the policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and action.

10. India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind. Our strengthened capability adds to our sense of responsibility. We do not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. We do not intend to engage in an arms race.

11. We had taken a number of initiatives in the past . We regret that these proposals did not receive a positive response from other nuclear weapon states. In fact, had their response been positive, we need not have gone in for our current testing programme. We have been and will continue to be in the forefront of the calls for opening negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, so that this challenge can be dealt with in the same manner that we have dealt with the scourge of two other weapons of mass destruction -- through the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

12. Traditionally, India has been an outward looking country. Our strong commitment to multilateralism is reflected in our active participation in organisations like the United Nations. This engagement will continue. The policies of economic liberalisation introduced in recent years have increased our regional and global linkages and my Government intends to deepen and strengthen these ties.

13. Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. We have not violated any international agreements either in 1974 or now, in 1998. The restraint exercised for 24 years, after having demonstrated our capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example. Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or doubt. The series of tests recently undertaken by India have led to the removal of doubts. The action involved was balanced in that it was the minimum necessary to maintain what is an irreducible component of our national security calculus.

14. Subsequently, Government has already announced that India will now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. We have also indicated willingness to move towards a de-jure formalisation of this declaration.

15. The House is no doubt aware of the different reactions that have emanated from the people of India and from different parts of the world. The overwhelming support of our citizens is our source of strength. It tells us not only that this decision was right but also that our country wants a focussed leadership, which attends to their security needs. This, I pledge to do as a sacred duty. We have also been greatly heartened by the outpouring of support from Indians abroad. They have, with one voice, spoken in favour of our action. To the people of India, and to Indians abroad, I convey my profound gratitude. We look to the people of India and Indians abroad for support in the difficult period ahead.

16 In this, the fiftieth year of our independence, we stand at a defining moment in our history. The rationale for the Government's decision is based on the same policy tenets that have guided us for five decades. These policies have been sustained successfully because of an underlying national consensus. It is vital to maintain the consensus as we approach the next millennium. In my statement today and in the paper placed before the House, I have elaborated on the rationale behind the Government's decision and outlined our approach for the future. The present decision and future actions will continue to reflect a commitment to sensibilities and obligations of an ancient civilisation a sense of responsibility and restraint, but a restraint born of the assurance of action, not of doubt or apprehension. Avoiding triumphalism, let us work together towards our shared objective in ensuring that as we move towards a new millennium, India will take its rightful place in the international community.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1524
2 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE PAPER LAID ON THE TABLE OF BOTH THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT OF INDIA ENTITLED "EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY"

I have the honour to transit herewith copy of the paper laid on the table of both the Houses of the Parliament of India entitled "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy".

I should be grateful if the above could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Savitri Kunadi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-62086

PAPER LAID ON THE TABLE OF THE HOUSE
ON

EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

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On 11 May, a statement was issued by Government announcing that India had successfully carried out three underground nuclear tests at the Pokhran range. Two days later, after carrying out two more under ground sub-kiloton tests, the Government announced the completion of the planned series of tests. The three underground nuclear tests carried out at 1545 hours on 11 May were with three difference devices -- a fission device, a low-yield sub-kiloton device and a thermonuclear device. The two tests carried out at 1221 hours on 13 May were also low-yield devices in the sub-kiloton range. The results from these tests have been in accordance with the expectations of our scientists.

2. In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self-reliance, and freedom of thought and action. We rejected the Cold War paradigm whose shadows were already appearing on the horizon and instead of aligning ourselves with either block, chose the more difficult path of non-alignment. This has required the building up of national strength through our own resources, our skills and creativity and the dedication of the people. Among the earliest initiatives taken by our first Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, was the development of science and inculcation of the scientific spirit. It is this initiative that laid the foundation for the achievement of 11 and 13 May, made possible by exemplary cooperation among the scientists from Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research & Development Organisation. Disarmament was then and continues to be a major plank in our foreign policy now. It was, in essence, and remains still, the natural course for a country that had waged a unique struggle for independence on the basis of 'ahimsa' and 'satyagraha'.

3. Development of nuclear technology transformed the nature of global security. Our leaders reasoned that nuclear weapons were not weapons of war, these were weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear-weapon-free-world would, therefore, enhance not only India's security but also the security of all nations. This is the principle plank of our nuclear policy. In the absence of universal and non discriminatory disarmament, we cannot accept a regime that creates an arbitrary division between nuclear haves and have-nots. India believes that it is the sovereign right of every nation to make a judgement regarding its supreme national interests and exercise its sovereign choice. We subscribe to the principle of equal and legitimate security interests of nations and consider it a sovereign right. At the

same time, our leaders recognised early that nuclear technology offers tremendous potential for economic development, especially for developing countries who are endeavouring to leap across the technology gaps created by long years of colonial exploitation. This thinking was reflected in the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1948, within a year of our independence. All the numerous initiatives taken by us since, in the field of nuclear disarmament have been in harmony and in continuation of those early enunciations.

4. In the 50's, nuclear weapons testing took place above ground and the characteristic mushroom cloud became the visible symbol of the nuclear age. India then took the lead in calling for an end to all nuclear weapon testing as the first step for ending the nuclear arms race. Addressing the Lok Sabha on 2 April, 1954, shortly after a major hydrogen bomb test had been conducted, Pt. Jawaharlal nehru stated that 'nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction. He called for negotiations for prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear testing. The world had by then witnessed less than 65 tests. Our call was not heeded. In 1963, an agreement was concluded to ban atmospheric testing but by this time, countries had developed the technologies for conducting underground nuclear tests and the nuclear arms race continued unabated. More than three decades passed and after over 2000 tests had been conducted, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996, following two and a half years of negotiations in which India had participated actively. In its final shape, this Treaty left much to be desired. It was neither comprehensive nor was it related to disarmament.

5. In 1963, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India had put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights and obligations was absent when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) emerged in 1968 almost 30 years ago. In the 60's our security concerns deepened. But such was our abhorrence of nuclear weapons and such our desire to avoid acquiring them that we sought national security guarantee from major nuclear powers of the world. The countries we turned to for support and understanding felt unable to extend to us the assurances that we then sought. That is when and why India made clear its inability to sign the NPT.

6. The Lok Sabha debated the NPT on 5 April, 1968. The then Prime Minister, late Mrs. Indira Gandhi assured the House that "we shall be guided entirely by our

self-enlightenment and the considerations of national security". She highlighted the shortcomings of the NPT whilst re-emphasising the country's commitment to nuclear disarmament. She warned the House and the country "that not signing the Treaty may bring the nation many difficulties. It may mean the stoppage of aid and stoppage of help. Since we are taking this decision together, we must all be together in facing its consequences". That was a turning point. This House then strengthened the decision of the Government by reflecting a national consensus.

7. Our decision not to sign the NPT was in keeping with the basic objective of maintaining freedom of thought and action. In 1974, we demonstrated our nuclear capability. Successive Governments thereafter have continued to take all necessary steps in keeping with that resolve and national will, to safeguard India's nuclear option. This was also the primary reason underlying the 1996 decision in the country not subscribing to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a decision that met the unanimous approval of the House yet again. Our perception then was that subscribing to the CTBT would severely limit India's nuclear potential at an unacceptably low level. Our reservations deepened as the CTBT did not also carry forward the nuclear disarmament process. On both counts, therefore, yet again our security concerns remained unaddressed. The then Minister for External Affairs, Mr. I.K. Gujral had made clear the Government's reasoning to this House during the discussions on this subject in 1996.

8. The decades of the 80's and 90's meanwhile witnessed the gradual deterioration of our security environment as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation. In our neighbourhood, nuclear weapons increased and more sophisticated delivery systems were inducted. Further, in our region there has come into existence a pattern about clandestine acquisition of nuclear materials, missiles and related technologies. India, in this period, became the victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, militancy and clandestine war through hired mercenaries.

9. The end of the Cold War marks a watershed in the history of the 20th century. While it has transformed the political landscape of Europe, it has done little to address India's security concerns. The relative order that was arrived at in Europe was not replicated in other parts of the globe.

10. At the global level, there is no evidence yet on the part of the nuclear weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world. Instead, the NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the

five countries who are also permanent members of the UN Security Council. Some of these countries have doctrines that permit the first use of nuclear weapons, these countries also engaged in programmes for modernisation of their nuclear arsenals.

11. Under such circumstances, India was left with little choice. It had to take necessary steps to ensure that the country's nuclear option, developed and safeguarded over decades not be permitted to erode by a voluntary self-imposed restraint. Indeed, such an erosion would have had an irremediably adverse impact on our security. The Government was thus faced with a difficult decision. The only touchstone that guided it was national security. Tests conducted on 11 and 13 May are a continuation of the policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and action. Nevertheless, there are certain moments when the chosen path reaches a fork and a decision has to be made. 1968 was one such moment in our nuclear chapter as were 1974 and 1996. At each of these moments, we took the right decision guided by national interest and supported by national consensus. 1998 was borne in the crucible of earlier decisions and made possible only because those decisions had been taken correctly in the past and in time.

12. At a time when developments in the area of advanced technologies are taking place at a breathtaking pace, new parameters need to be identified, tested and validated in order to ensure that skills remain contemporary and succeeding generations of scientists and engineers are able to build on the work done by their predecessors. The limited series of five tests undertaken by India was precisely such an exercise. It has achieved its stated objective. The data provided by these tests is critical to validate our capabilities in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and different delivery systems. Further, these tests have significantly enhanced the capabilities of our scientists and engineers in computer simulation of new designs and enabled them to undertake sub-critical experiments in future, if considered necessary. In terms of technical capability, our scientists and engineers have the requisite resources to ensure a credible deterrent.

13. Our policies towards our neighbours and other countries too have not changed; India remains fully committed to the promotion of peace with stability, and resolution of all outstanding issues through bilateral dialogue and negotiations. These tests were not directed against any country; these were intended to reassure the people of India about their security and convey determination that this Government, like previous Governments, has the capability and resolve to

safeguard their national security interests. The Government will continue to remain engaged in substantive dialogue with our neighbours to improve relations and to expand the scope of our interactions in a mutually advantageous manner. Confidence building is a continuous process; we remain committed to it. Consequent upon the tests and arising from an insufficient appreciation of our security concerns, some countries have been persuaded to take steps that sadden us. We value our bilateral relations. We remain committed to dialogue and reaffirm that preservation of India's security create no conflict of interest with these countries.

14. India is a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek, nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientist and engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind. Our strengthened capability adds to our sense of responsibility; the responsibility and obligation of power. India, mindful of its international obligations, shall not use these weapons to commit aggression or to mount threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence and to ensure that in turn, India is also not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. In 1994, we had proposed that India and Pakistan jointly undertake not to be the first to use their nuclear capability against each other. The Government on this occasion, reiterates its readiness to discuss a "no-first-use" agreement with that country, as also with other countries bilaterally, or in a collective forum. India shall not engage in an arms race. India shall also not subscribe or reinvent the doctrines of the Cold War. India remains committed to the basic tenet of our foreign policy -- a conviction that global elimination of nuclear weapons will enhance its security as well as that of the rest of the world. It will continue to urge countries, particularly other nuclear weapon states to adopt measures that would contribute meaningfully to such an objective.

15. A number of initiatives have been taken in the past. In 1978, India proposed negotiations for an international convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was followed by another initiative in 1982 calling for a 'nuclear freeze' -- a prohibition on production of fissile materials for weapons, on production of nuclear weapons, and related delivery systems. In 1988, we put forward an Action Plan for phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. It is our regret that these proposals did not receive a positive response from other nuclear weapon states. Had their response been positive, India need not have gone for the current tests. This is where our approach to nuclear weapons is different from others. This difference is the cornerstone of our nuclear doctrine. It is marked by restraint and striving for the total elimination of

all weapons of mass destruction.

16. We will continue to support such initiatives, taken individually or collectively by the Non-Aligned Movement which has continued to attach the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. This was reaffirmed most recently, last week, at the NAM Ministerial meeting held at Cartagena which has "reiterated their call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee to start in 1998 negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention". The collective voice of 113 NAM countries reflects an approach to global nuclear disarmament to which India has remained committed. One of the NAM member initiatives to which we attach great importance was the reference to the International Court of Justice resulting in the unanimous declaration from the ICJ, as part of the Advisory Opinion handed down on 8 July, 1996, that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith **and bring to a conclusion** negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". India was one of the countries that appealed to the ICJ on this issue. No other nuclear weapon state has supported this judgement; in fact, they have sought to decry its value. We have been and will continue to be in the forefront of the calls for opening negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, so that this challenge can be dealt with in the same manner that we have dealt with the scourge of two other weapons of mass destruction -- through the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In keeping with our commitment to comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory approaches to disarmament, India is an original State Party to both these Conventions. Accordingly, India will shortly submit the plan of destruction of its chemical weapons to the international authority -- Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We fulfil our obligations whenever we undertake them.

17. Traditionally, India has been an outward looking country. Our strong commitment to multilateralism is reflected in our active participation in organisations like the United Nations. In recent years, in keeping with the new challenges, we have actively promoted regional cooperation -- in SAARC, in the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation and as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum. This engagement will also continue. The policies of economic liberalisation introduced in recent years have increased our regional and global linkages and the Government shall deepen and strengthen these ties.

18. Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. It has not

violated any international agreements either in 1974 or now, in 1998. Our concerns have been made known to our interlocutors in recent years. The restraint exercised for 24 years, after having demonstrated our capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example. Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or doubt. Restraint is valid only when doubts are removed. The series of tests undertaken by India have led to the removal of doubts. The action involved was balanced in that it was the minimum necessary to maintain what is an irreducible component of our national security calculus. This Government's decision has, therefore, to be seen as part of a tradition of restrain that has characterised our policy in the past 50 years.

19. Subsequent to the tests Government has already stated that India will now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. It has also indicated willingness to move towards a de-jure formalisation of this declaration. The basic obligation of the CTBT are thus met; to refrain from undertaking nuclear test explosions. This voluntary declaration is intended to convey to the international community the seriousness of our intent for meaningful engagement. Subsequent decisions will be taken after assuring ourselves of the security needs of the country.

20. India has also indicated readiness to participate in negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The basic objective of this treaty is to prohibit future production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. India's approach in these negotiations will be to ensure that this treaty emerges as a universal and non-discriminatory treaty, backed by an effective verification mechanism. When we embark on these negotiations, it shall be in the full confidence of the adequacy and credibility of the nation's weaponised nuclear deterrent.

21. India has maintained effective export controls on nuclear materials as well as related technologies even though we are neither a party to the NPT nor a member of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. Nonetheless, India is committed to non-proliferation and the maintaining of stringent export controls to ensure that there is no leakage of our indigenously developed know-how and technologies. In fact, India's conduct in this regard has been better than some countries party to the NPT.

22. India has in the past conveyed our concerns on the inadequacies of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It has explained that the country was not in a position to join because the regime did not address our country's security concerns. These could have been addressed by moving towards global

nuclear disarmamnet, our preferred approach. As this did not take place, India was obliged to stand aside from the emerging regime so that its freedom of action was not constrained. This is the precise path that has continued to be followed unwaveringly for the last three decades. That same constructive approach will underlie India's dialogue with countries that need to be persuaded of our serious intent and willingness to engage so that mutual concerns are satisfactorily addressed. The challenge to Indian statecraft is balancing and reconciling India's security imperatives with valid international concerns in this regard.

23. The House is aware of the different reactions that have emanated from the people of India and from different parts of the world. The overwhelming support of the citizens of India is a source of strength for the Government. It not only tells that this decision was right but also that the country wants a focussed leadership, which attends to national security needs. This the Government pledges to do as a sacred duty. The Government have also been greatly heartened by the outpouring of support from Indians abroad. They have, with one voice, spoken in favour of the Government's action. The Government conveys its profound gratitude to the citizens of India and to Indians abroad, and looks to them for support in the difficult period ahead.

24. In this, the fiftieth year of our independence, India stands at a defining moment in our history. The rationale for the Government's decision is based on the same policy tenets that have guided the country for five decades. These policies were sustained successfully because of the underlying national consensus. The present decision and future actions will continue to reflect a commitment to sensibilities and obligations of an ancient civilization, a sense of responsibility and restraint, but a restraint born of the assurance of action, not of doubts or apprehension. The Gita explains (Chapter VI-3) as none other can:

आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म : कारणमुच्यते
योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शम : कारणमुच्यते

(This passage interprets as: Action is a process to reach a goal; action may reflect tumult but when measured and focussed, will yield its objective of stability and peace)

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1525
2 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 28 MAY 1998

I have the honour to transmit herewith the Statement of the Official Spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, 28 May, 1998.

I should be grateful if the above could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Savitri Kunadi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT BY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN

Our High Commissioner in Pakistan was called in by the Pakistan Foreign Secretary at 0210 hours (IST) this morning. The Pakistan Foreign Secretary conveyed to our High Commissioner that India was preparing to attack the nuclear facilities of Pakistan. Our High Commissioner dismissed this as an utterly absurd and malicious allegation. Pakistan has also sought to spread this canard in the UN and some important world capitals. In the normal course we would not have lent dignity to this vicious propaganda but as it could be a part of a more nefarious design, we would like to make it clear that India stands committed to uphold its treaty obligations and agreements including the India-Pakistan Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities. There is no intention, on our part, to heighten tension between India and Pakistan. We see in these Pakistani efforts yet another example of their deep frustration. We are confident that all concerned will reject these crude manifestations of the traditional Pakistani mindset of hostility against India.

New Delhi
28.05.1998

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1526
2 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A REPLY GIVEN BY THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO A QUESTION ON PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TEST, 30 MAY 1998

I have the honour to transmit herewith the reply given by the Official Spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs to a question on Pakistan's Nuclear Test, 30 May, 1998

I should be grateful if the above could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Savitri Kunadi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.98-62152

OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN'S REPLY TO A QUESTION ON PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TEST

We are in the knowledge of Pakistan having conducted one more nuclear test today. This development was expected. Facts are being ascertained. Government's stand has been made clear by Prime Minister in Parliament yesterday. As is well known, India is already observing a voluntary moratorium. Pakistan has sought to justify its nuclear tests by projecting an alleged threat from India. As Prime Minister has already stated, India does not pose a threat to Pakistan. The Prime Minister also reiterated the offer to hold discussions with Pakistan on a no-first-use agreement reflecting our desire to maintain peace and stability in the region. Government is watching the situation carefully. Government remains fully prepared to deal firmly and effectively with any threat to India's national security.

New Delhi
30.05.1998

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1527
3 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF POLAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE SPOKESMAN OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND ON 28 MAY 1998

I have the honour to transmit to you the attached text of a statement issued by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on 28 May 1998.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Krzysztof Jakubowski
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on 28 May, 1998 concerning the underground nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan

"Poland has taken note with grave concern of the underground nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan. We strongly deplore the aggravating situation in the South Asian region which can have extremely serious consequences for international security. Poland resolutely opposes the on-going escalation of the nuclear arms race with all its incalculable effects on that security.

We are strongly convinced that the resolution of all regional tensions and conflicts should be sought through dialogue as well as bilateral and plurilateral negotiations, with due regard for international security and the legitimate right of the international community to co-exist in peace.

Addressing an appeal to the two States in South Asia and bearing in mind the statement of the President of the UN Security Council, Poland calls on Pakistan and India to forswear further tests and to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without delay."



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1528
3 June 1998

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 2 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING TWO STATEMENTS ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE ON 11 AND 28 MAY 1998 IN CONNECTION WITH THE NUCLEAR TESTS CARRIED OUT BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN, RESPECTIVELY

The Permanent Mission of Chile presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to request it to distribute as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament the two attached statements issued by the Government of Chile on 11 and 28 May 1998 in connection with the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, respectively.

GE.98-62116 (E)

PRESS RELEASE

The Government of Chile expresses its most forceful rejection of the recent nuclear explosions carried out by the Government of India. These constitute an unnecessary threat to international peace and security, since in today's world they are completely without justification.

In addition, they seriously harm the process of entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, to which the vast majority of the international community stands committed.

Furthermore, in carrying out those tests, India, as a founding member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, is breaching the agreements reached at the eleventh summit meeting of heads of State and Government of the Movement held in Cartagena, Colombia, which are intended to promote nuclear disarmament. The Government of Chile is steadfast in its policy of rejection of nuclear explosions as well as any acts which run counter to the collective efforts of the international community to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

Santiago, 11 May 1998

PRESS RELEASE

The Government of Chile expresses its most forceful rejection and condemnation of the nuclear explosions carried out this morning by the Government of Pakistan. They constitute a further threat to international peace and security and represent a backward step vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

At the same time, the Government of Chile expresses its concern at the destabilizing effect of these actions for South Asia.

In addition, these explosions violate the agreements and declarations of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, of which Pakistan is a member, as reaffirmed at the Non-Aligned ministerial meeting held in Cartagena between 18 and 20 May this year.

Chile reiterates its steadfast policy of rejection and condemnation of nuclear explosions carried out by any member of the international community. The Government of Chile calls on all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without conditions.

Santiago, 28 May 1998

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1529
3 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1998 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ROMANIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA WHILE ON A STATE VISIT TO CANADA ON 29 MAY 1998 TAKING NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS ESCALATION OF TENSIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

I have the honour to send you the statement issued by H.E. Mr. Emil Constantinescu, President of Romania, on 29 May 1998, while on a State Visit to Canada, taking notice of the dangerous escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan.

I would be grateful if, in accordance with the established practice, you would arrange for this statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations, both of member and of observer States.

(Signed) Pavel Grecu
Acting Permanent Representative

GE.98-62158

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Together with the entire international community, Romania condemns the dangerous actions, jeapordizing world peace, which the Governments of India and Pakistan have recently engaged, along the lines of potential nuclear conflict. Romania has suffered too much as a result of nuclear escalation during the Cold War period to look on with indifference to the serious dangers which certain countries bring upon themselves, and upon the entire world, when attempting, through aggressive policies, to open up again the tragic era of mutual nuclear threats, of suspicion and fear. After 1989, mankind now finally has the chance for global peaceful development. We ask all responsible political decision makers, from all the countries of the world, to honestly cooperate, so as not to let this chance go by.

Access to nuclear energy involves a high degree of responsibility to the citizens of one's own country and to the world as a whole. Any country which holds and uses nuclear reactors must undertake full responsibility and not allow for the perversion of their use as nuclear weapons. Romania, a co-signatory of all relevant international agreements, has developed, in a spirit of full responsibility and transparency, production units for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, and which have been and continue to be permanently and unreservedly submitted to international control. Therefore, we have the moral authority to call upon India and Pakistan to refrain from any action of a nature to bring the threat of nuclear war back to the forefront of international relations.

Romania, as it has always done, will respect all decisions taken by international bodies in this respect. We join all member states of the Security Council and North Atlantic Alliance which demand that India and Pakistan immediately and permanently put an end to nuclear tests and mutual threats. Both countries should openly recognize that it is the right of the international community to ask all its members to put an end, for good, to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or of any other means of mass destruction, which jeopordize all of mankind.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1530
3 June 1998

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FINLAND TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A JOINT STATEMENT BY MR. GUIDO DI TELLA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ARGENTINA AND MRS. TARJA HALONEN, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND ON THE INDIAN AND PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TESTS

I have the honour to transmit to you the joint statement by Mr. Guido Di Tella, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina and Mrs. Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The statement was issued on 30 May 1998 in Helsinki, in connection with the State visit of President Carlos Menem of Argentina to Finland.

I would be grateful if you could circulate this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Markku Reimaa
Ambassador

GE.98-62164

The joint statement made in Helsinki 30 May 1998 by Mr. Guido Di Tella, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina and Mrs. Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.

Argentina and Finland are dismayed and disappointed at the news on nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. We urge the two countries to refrain from any further tests.

The recent tests are contrary to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. They also undermine the stability and threaten to trigger an accelerated arms race in the region.

Argentina and Finland together with the International Community underline the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

We appeal to India and Pakistan to become parties to the NPT and CTBT and call for a peaceful dialogue to address the causes of the tensions between them.

Argentina and Finland reiterate their common commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and other weapons of mass destruction as well as their conviction to abstain from their development or possession. Total transparency in this matter constitutes the best guarantee for regional and global peace and security and friendship among nations, as it is shown in their respective regions in the Americas and Europe.+++